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According to the United States Supreme Court, the press coverage
surrounding a certain murder trial was a media carnival. 1 Among the more
"flagrant episodes" 2 of media attention, nine days before trial a local editorial
reported about a defense counsel poll concerning the defendant's guilt or
innocence. The Court concluded that the poll constituted "mass jury
tampering." 3 A later radio debate accused the defense counsel of blocking
justice and asserted that the defendant must be guilty because he hired a
prominent criminal attorney. 4 On the first day of the trial, the jury viewed the
murder scene while hundreds of reporters, camera operators, and onlookers
swarmed the area. While one representative of the news media observed the
jury's inspection of the scene, a local newspaper rented a helicopter to fly over
the scene and photograph jurors.5 Also during the trial, a radio commentator
likened the defendant to a perjurer and compared the trial to Alger Hiss'
confrontation with Whittaker Chambers. 6 Other reports characterized the
defendant as a "Dr. Jeckyl and Mr. Hyde" character7 and reported that the
arrestee's mistress and mother of his child was arrested for robbery.8 In the
words of the Supreme Court, "[b]edlam reigned at the courthouse during the
trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom." 9 Whereas these
media shenanigans might resemble recent media exploitation of the O.J.
Simpson trial, 10 this media circus arose from a 1954 Cleveland murder" case
* This Note received the 1995 Rebecca Topper Memorial Award as the third year
writing that contributed most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal.
I See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
2 I. at 345.
3 Id. at 345-46.
4 I. at 346.
5 1d. at 347.
6 Id
7 Id. at 348.
9 Id. at 355.
10 See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Shocking Images and Muffled Sobs After All the Hype, a
Process of Grisly Detail Begins, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1995, at Al, A15 (noting that the
OJ. Simpson trial is surrounded by "hype and sensationalism" and "media scrutiny"); Rita
Ciolli, ThaI of the Century: Rage, Blood, Sex and Celebrity is the Formua, and O.J.
Simpson's Case Isn't the First to Capture the Rapt Attention of America, CLEvELAND PLAIN
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that created trial judges' duty to protect criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights.12
I. INTRODUCTION
Since this Supreme Court decision, trial courts struggling to fulfill this duty
have experimented with various forms of gag orders. Some cases restrain the
press from reporting upon certain aspects of the proceedings; 13 other cases
order trial participants, witnesses, court personnel, and law enforcement
officers not to speak to the press about the proceedings. 14 As judges have
DEALER, Jan. 22, 1995, at IC (describing other trials in the twentieth century touted as the
"trial of the century"); Ellen Goodman, O.J. in the Morning, O.J. in the Evening, O.J. at
Suppertime, Cm. TRiB., Jan. 24, 1995, at 15 (stating that the author wants to be on the O.
Simpson jury because "the jury only has to live with this gawdforsaken trial eight hours a
day."); Howard Kurtz, They've Got Him Covered: TV Examines Simpson from Every Angle,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1995, at Cl (stating that "[tihere's no end in sight" for the television
coverage of the OJ. Simpson trial); David Margolick, Not Guilty: The Overview; Jwy
Clears Simpson in Double Murder; Spellbound Nation Divides on Verdict, N.Y. TImEs,
October 4, 1995; Haya El Nasser & Sally Ann Stewart, Verdict Revealed Today, USA
TODAY, October 3, 1995 at IA; Howard Rosenberg, The 03. Simpson Murder Trial: Tne
to Pull Plug on 7I's Trivial Pursuit, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1995, at A7 (instructing the
media covering the trial to "[sitop it, already, with the live cameras and minute-by-minute
score-keeping, the hasty, instant verdicts that treat this fetus of a trial as if it were ending
instead of just beginning," and telling reporters covering the trial to "put away [their] Ouija
boards, too."); TV Spots, NEWSDAY, Jan. 25, 1995, at B64 (stating that the low of the trial
coverage was a television debate concerning the trial attorneys' fashion styles); Isabel
Wilkerson, Whose Side to Take: Women, Outrage and the Verdict on O.J. Simpson, N.Y.
TIMES, October 8, 1995, at 4:1.
11 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 335-36.
12 See id. at 362 ("Given the pervasiveness of modem communications and the
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must
take strong measures to ensure that the balance [between the First Amendment and the Sixth
Amendment rights] is never weighed against the accused."). The Sixth Amendment states in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13 See, e.g., State ex rel. National Broadcasting Co. v. Lake County Court of
Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990).
14 See, e.g., KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302
(1982) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice); News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499 (11th
Cir. 1991); Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1158 (1986); see also Michael E. Swartz, Note, Trial Participant Speech
Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1411, 1412 n.12
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issued these orders, the media and trial participants have challenged the orders
as unconstitutional infringements upon their First Amendment rights to free
speech and free press. 15 Defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial
conflict with the press' and public's rights to free speech and free press. 16
Whereas judicial resolutions of these First Amendment challenges have applied
various standards and have reached seemingly inconsistent rulings, 17 Ohio trial
judges in criminal cases18 can formulate constitutional gag orders if they are
(1990). See generally Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternatve Vew of Media-Judiary
Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests about the Fair Trial-Free Press Isue, 18
HOF5TRA L. REV. 1 (1989) (analyzing social scientific research on the conflict between the
rights of the media and the duties of the judiciary).
15 See sources cited supra note 14. The First Amendment states in pertinent part.
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Smart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976). The Supreme Court
noted that this conflict between the First and Sixth Amendments must have been anticipated
by the Framers of the Constitution; yet, these Framers did not resolve the conflict:
The problems presented by this case are almost as old as the Republic. Neither in
the Constitution nor in contemporaneous writings do we find that the conflict between
these two important rights was anticipated, yet it is inconceivable that the authors of the
Constitution were unaware of the potential conflicts between the right to an unbiased
jury and the guarantee of freedom of the press.
kL Because the Framers did not choose one amendment to prevail over the other, the Court
also refused to assign such priority. Id. at 561; cf. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362. But see Dow
Jones & Co. v. Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1988) ("When the exercise of free press
rights actually tramples upon Sixth Amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to
the latter.").
17 In Nebraska Press, the Court noted how difficult it is for trial court judges to
determine what information may be reported upon and what information may become
prejudicial:
The dilemma posed underscores how difficult it is for trial judges to predict what
information will in fact undermine the impartiality of jurors, and the difficulty of
drafting an order that will effectively keep prejudicial information from prospective
jurors. When a restrictive order is sought, a court can anticipate only part of what will
develop that may injure the accused. But information not so obviously prejudicial may
emerge, and what may properly be published in these "gray zone" circumstances may
not violate the restrictive order and yet be prejudicial.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 566-67. This difficulty on the part of trial judges may lead to
varying formulations of gag orders and seemingly inconsistent decisions.
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guided by U.S. Supreme Court decisions, federal circuit court decisions, and
disciplinary and court rules.
Part II outlines some United States Supreme Court decisions holding that
trial judges have an affirmative duty to protect defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights. While protecting these rights, trial judges generally may not close the
courtroom, yet these rights are sufficiently protected even when jury members
know about extensive media coverage. Part I[[ discusses the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart19 and concludes that trial
judges generally may not issue a gag order directly restraining what the press
may report. As an alternative to a gag order directed at the press, Part IV
advocates an order restricting what trial participants may say to the press. Such
orders are warranted only when trial participant speech poses a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing the fairness of the proceeding. Federal
cases and court and disciplinary rules provide Ohio trial judges with further
bases on which to support such an order. Part V then cautions Ohio trial judges
that constitutional orders must not be overbroad and must be based on explicit
findings that reject other alternatives. 20 By carefully following the requirements
18 This Note focuses on Ohio decisions in criminal cases as these decisions may be
guided by federal case decisions. The Note examines only criminal cases in which the First
and Sixth Amendment rights conflict. Whereas the Sixth Amendment guarantees an
"impartial jury," U.S. CoNST. amend. VI, in civil cases, the Seventh Amendment
guarantees only a "trial by jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Wachsman v.
Disciplinary Counsel, No. C-2-90-335, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20899, at *28-30 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 30, 1991) (holding that Ohio's DR 7-107(G) concerning attorney out of court
statements in civil proceedings is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague). Consequently,
restrictions on attorney speech in criminal cases may be more warranted than restrictions on
speech in civil proceedings. Differences between criminal and civil proceedings that may
justify different treatment of attorney speech include the longer length of civil proceedings
and the more extensive discovery available in civil litigation. Id. at *28-29. Civil
proceedings also may involve significant social issues that should not be hidden from the
public, and the attorney in the civil proceeding often is the only person who has knowledge
regarding the need for government action or correction. Id. at *29. A civil action attorney
also may be the only person who realizes the significance of the knowledge he or she
possesses. Id.
19 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In Nebraska Press, the Court distinguished between prior
restraints on the press, such as an injunction not to publish information about a case, and
restraints on persons involved in the case concerning their comments to the press. Id. at
564; see also In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 453-54 (Ohio) (upholding a gag order in an
Ohio juvenile case and citing Central S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Sigma
Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182 (D. S.C.), aftd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).
20 See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562 (in which part of the three-pronged test for
restraints on the press states that the trial judge must consider "whether other measures
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for gag orders set forth in this Note, Ohio trial judges may constitutionally
restrict trial participants' speech and affirmatively protect defendants' rights to
impartial juries.
II. SOME U.S. SUPREME COURT HISTORY INTERPRETING SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Sheppard v. Maxwell-Trial Judges' Obligation to Preserve Sbth
Amendment Rights
The conflict between the First and Sixth Amendments in the context of gag
orders in criminal cases stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard
v. Maxwell,21 holding that trial judges have "an affirmative duty to ensure the
impartiality of jurors" and to protect defendants' fair trial rights.22 In
Sheppard, the trial judge refused to issue a gag order or to explicitly instruct
the jury as to the dangers of prejudice inherent in excessive media coverage.23
Instead, the judge merely told the jury to "pay no attention whatever to that
type of scavenging . . . [and to] confine [them]selves to this courtroom, if
[they] please." 24 The Supreme Court, however, held that freedom of speech
and press may not divert the trial from the "very purpose of a court system...
to adjudicate controversies.., in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom
according to legal procedures."25
This suggestion that the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial may
outweigh the First Amendment right to free speech and free press, coupled
would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity"); State ex rel.
National Broadcasting Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (Ohio 1990)
("a gag order cannot issue unless 'specific, on the record findings' are made demonstrating
that a gag order is 'essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest'" (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986)));
State e rel. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp. v. Brown, 471 N.E.2d 874, 882 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984) ("The trial court must first exhaust all other less restnictive mneasures to determine if a
fair trial can be had before denying [media] coverage .... ").
21 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see also Sheldon Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from
Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond,
29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 403 (1977) ("Sheppard v. Maxwell, perhaps more than any other
case, exemplifies the conflict between free press and fair trial.").
22 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63; see also Swartz, supra note 14, at 1418.
23 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353.
24 Id. at 348.




with some dicta of the Sheppard Court, provided later trial judges and
reviewing courts with a justification to restrict trial participants' and counsels'
speech. When the Court chastised the trial judge for not making "some effort
to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police
officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides," 26 it prompted later judges
to uphold some restrictions on trial participants' speech. The Sheppard trial
judge's failure to restrict such leaks allowed inaccurate information to be
disclosed and led to "groundless rumors and confusion." 27 Because the
Sheppard Court noted that effective control of counsel "might well have
prevented the divulgence of inaccurate information, rumors, and accusations
that made up much of the inflammatory publicity," 28 later Supreme Court and
federal circuit court decisions concluded that carefully constructed gag orders
can be constitutional. 29
B. Trial Judges May Not Close the Courtroom to the Press and Public
Although the Sheppard Court instructed trial judges that they have a duty
to control excessive media attention in order to preserve defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights, 30 trial judges generally may not close the courtroom31 to
the press and public when exercising that duty.32 In Richmond Newspapers,
2 6 Id. at 359.
27 Id.
2 8 Id. at 361; see also Portman, supra note 21, at 406, stating:
Mhe United States Supreme Court confirmed the authority and the responsibility of
trial judges to take affirmative action to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Authorized means include not only the control of activities in and about the courtroom
during trial but, more significantly, the release of information by police, lawyers,
witnesses, defendants, and court officials.
Id.
29 See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
majority opinion); KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302,
1307 (1982) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice); Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 608
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); In re Russel, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); see also text accompanying notes 76-144, infra.
3 0 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63; see also Swartz, supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
31 The trial judge may close a preliminary hearing only if such actions are essential to
preserve "higher values." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986)
(quoting Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). Such "higher
values" may include the substantial probability that the right to a fair trial will be prejudiced
and that closure would prevent such prejudice. Id. at 14.
32 See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
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Inc. v. Virginia,3 3 the Court held that criminal trials are presumptively open.34
Because the First Amendment guarantees persons the right to "receive
information and ideas," 35 it protects the rights of all people to attend criminal
trials36 and it prohibits trial judges in criminal cases from summarily closing
the courtroom.37 The trial court in Richmond Newspapers violated the press' 38
and public's First Amendment rights when it closed the courtroom without
considering if any less drastic remedies could assure the defendant an impartial
jury.39 Before closing the trial, the trial court must find that an "overriding
interest" requires closure,40 and according to the Richmond Newspapers Court,
possible contamination of the jury pool because of media statements is not a
sufficiently "overriding interest."41
C. An Impartial Jury Does Not Have to Be Ignorant of All Press
Coverage
As the consideration of "overriding interests" in Richmond Newspapers
suggests, although Ohio trial court judges have a duty under Sheppard to
preserve defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury,42 they need
33 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
34 Id. at 573.
35 L at 576 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)). The Open
Courts Clause of the Ohio Constitution, OHIO CONST., art. I, §16, creates no greater right of
public access to court proceedings than that found in the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. The Ohio Constitution creates a qualified right to proceedings that
historically have been open to the public and in which public access plays a significant
positive role. In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 448 (Ohio 1990).
36 The Sixth Circuit determined that the guarantee of open public proceedings in
criminal trials includes voir dire. In re Memphis Publishing Co., 887 F.2d 646, 648-49 (6th
Cir. 1989). The right to access, however, does not extend to pretrial proceedings when trial
participants agree that the pretrial proceedings should be closed to protect the defendant's
rights. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979).
37 RichrondNewspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.
38 The press, however, does not have any greater right to access of criminal trials than
does the public in general. Mark R. Stabile, Note, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be
Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Oiminal Care?, 79 GEO. L.. 337, 346 (1990) (citing
Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978)).
39 RchnondNewspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81.
40 d. at 581.
41 Id.
42 See supra part lI.A. In Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
1985) (Beezer, J.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986), Judge Beezer noted that the
government, in contrast to the defendant in a criminal trial, does not have an absolute right
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not assure that the jury pool is completely ignorant of the circumstances
surrounding the trial. Defendants' rights to impartial juries do not require that
the juries be oblivious to media coverage. Rather, impartial jurors in a criminal
trial must base the trial's outcome on material admitted into evidence within a
court proceeding. 43 Even when the news coverage is adverse to the defendant,
extensive pretrial publicity does not necessarily lead to an unfair trial.44 When
considering extensive media attention in Irvin v. Dowd,45 a murder and death
penalty case, the Court stated:
In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication,
an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the
vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not
have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.46
to an impartial jury: "[It is appropriate for the defense, within certain limits, to seek a jury
partial to the defendant." Id. at 596-97. This ability of the defendant to seek a partial jury,
however, is limited by the government's and public's legitimate expectations that the
judicial system will produce fair results. Id.
43 Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1070 (1991). Alfredo Garcia explains in his
article about the conflicts between the First and Sixth Amendments that the trial judge's
Sheppard obligation to preserve an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment often
interferes with the press' and public's First Amendment interests:
[A] trial court... must attempt to stem the flow of prejudicial publicity from reaching
the public in the hope that a jury untainted by the information may be selected. If that
arrangement is not possible, then the judge must ensure that a jury exposed to such
information is willing and able to set aside its preconceived notions and decide the case
solely on the evidence presented. Though the first alternative is preferable since it
enhances the probability of finding an impartial jury, it runs head-on into the freedom of
the media to report on matters of public interest.
Alfredo Garcia, Cash of the 7tans. The D fficult Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and a Free
Press in Modem American Society, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1107, 1110 (1992).
44 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976); see also Garcia, supra
note 43 at 1121 ("Mere juror exposure to the defendant's prior convictions or to news
accounts surrounding the crime with which he is charged do not automatically lead to
prejudice") (construing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975)). See generally
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and
Contraction Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 443-53 (1977) (discussing the effect of
prejudicial media coverage on juries and citing social science studies).




As a result, the Court held that a juror who may have a preconceived
notion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence still properly may serve on the
jury. As long as that juror can set aside his or her opinion and can render a
verdict based only on evidence presented in court, the juror may be part of a
constitutionally impartial jury.47
Although eligible jurors may be aware of extensive media attention and
may form preconceived opinions as to the defendant's guilt or innocence, the
U.S. Supreme Court found some circumstances in which media attention so
influenced the prospective jury pool that an impartial jury could not be seated.
In Irvin v. Dond,48 for example, the Court vacated49 a murder conviction in a
habeas corpus proceeding because an examination of prospective jurors
revealed that almost ninety percent of the questioned persons entertained some
opinion as to the defendant's guilt.50 Media coverage included comments from
trial spectators stating their opinions that the defendant was guilty and that he
"should be hanged." 51 Similarly, in Rideau v. Louisiana,52 the Supreme Court
held that the defendant in a murder and bank robbery case was denied due
process when the trial judge refused to change the venue.53 The venue in which
the trial was conducted was exposed so repeatedly to a broadcast of the
defendant's confession,54 the Court determined that any subsequent court
proceedings in the community would be a "hollow formality." 55
In a more recent case, however, the Court found that even in the face of
extensive adverse media coverage, the passage of time between the pretrial
media accounts and the actual trial still may permit an impartial jury to be
seated. In Patton v. Yount,56 the press disclosed the defendant's prior
conviction, confession, and plea of temporary insanity, all facts inadmissible at
trial. Voir dire questionnaires further revealed that nearly all the members of
the jury pool heard about the case and that seventy-seven percent of the jurors
4 7 Id. at 723.
48 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
49 Id. at 729.
50 Id. at 727.
51d.
52 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
53 Id. at 726.
5 4 The day after the defendant was apprehended by the police, the interview containing
the confession was broadcast to some 24,000 people in the community. The next day the
rebroadcast of the interview reached approximately 53,000 people in the television
audience, and the following day another broadcast was seen by about 29,000 people. The
venue in which these broadcasts occurred and in which the trial was held contained only
about 150,000 people. Id. at 724.
55 Id. at 726.
56 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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admitted that they had formulated an opinion as to the defendant's guilt. 57
Despite this seemingly prejudicial media coverage, the Court found that the
four years that passed between the first trial and the second trial permitted an
impartial jury in the second trial.58
As Ohio trial judges therefore fulfill their obligations under Sheppard and
craft gag orders restricting First Amendment rights, they must craft orders that
allow juries to make impartial decisions based on evidence introduced at trial.
To properly account for defendants' Sixth Amendment rights, gag orders need
not prevent the jury pool from developing preconceived opinions as to guilt or
innocence, and they need not restrain all press coverage of the trial.
Ill. NEBRASKA PRESS AND THE PROHIBmON AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINTS
ON THE MEDIA
If a gag order restrains all press coverage of the trial, the order is
unconstitutional. According to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart,59 a gag order directly restraining what the press may
report almost always violates the press' First Amendment rights. 60 The
Nebraska Press trial court restrained newspapers, broadcasters, journalists,
news media associations, and national newswire services from publishing or
broadcasting confessions or admissions made by the accused and from
publishing other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused. 61 Holding that a
57 Id. at 1029.
58 Id. at 1033-35; see also Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 (1991). When
distinguishing a capital murder case involving defendant Mu'min from Irvin, the Court
noted that the Mu'min community was much larger-the community had a population of
182,537 and a part of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Id. The Court also noted
that the news accounts in the Mu'min case did not involve the same type of damaging
information present in Irvin. The Court noted that much of the publicity was directed at the
Department of Corrections and generally at the judicial system: "Any killing that ultimately
results in a charge of capital murder will engender considerable media coverage... ." Id.
59 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
60 Id. at 570 (stating that barriers against prior restraints are high and the presumption
exists against issuing prior restraints).
61 d. at 543. The order applied only until the jury was impaneled, and it specifically
prohibited petitioners from reporting about five subjects:
(1) the existence or contents of a confession of the defendant, which had been
introduced in open court at arraignment;
(2) the existence of or nature of statements the defendant made to other persons;
(3) the contents of a note the defendant wrote the night of the crime;
(4) certain aspects of medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; and
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presumption exists against issuing prior restraints directly regulating what the
press may report,62 the majority opinion set forth criteria that trial courts must
consider when determining whether to order a prior restraint.63 Before issuing
such a restraint, the trial judge must examine: (1) "the nature and extent of
pretrial news coverage"; 64 (2) "whether other measures would be likely to
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity"; 65 and (3) "how
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened
danger." 66 These criteria set forth the narrow circumstances under which a gag
order directed at the press may be warranted. In fact, subsequent readings of
Nebraska Press construe the case as a "virtual bar" to prior restraints on the
media. 67 Because Nebraska Press instructs trial judges to consider the
availability of other mitigating measures, 68 virtually no situations exist in which
a direct restraint upon the press is the only feasible balance between Sixth and
First Amendment rights. 69 When fashioning constitutional gag orders, Ohio
trial judges must take guidance from the Nebraska Press decision and must
avoid directly restraining the press from reporting on the proceedings.
A. Ohio Cases Support Nebraska Press
The Ohio Supreme Court echoed the Nebraska Press presumption against
prior restraints in State cc rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Kainrad7°
when it held that a court may directly restrain the press only if imperative and
only if a court makes specific findings that all other measures would not ensure
a fair trial. 71 In Kainrad, the Ohio Supreme Court overturned an order
(5) the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault.
Id. at 543-44. The order also prohibited the press from reporting about the exact nature of
the order. Id. at 544.
62 Id. at 570.




67 Stabile, supra note 38, at 342 (citing LAURENcE H. TRINE, AMERICAN
CONOTrunONAL LAW 858-59 (2d ed. 1988)); see also James C. Goodale, The Press
Ungagged: 7he Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 497, 498 (1977) (arguing that the practical impact of the Nebraska
Press case is to outlaw all prior restraints in the free press-fair trial area); infra text
accompanying notes 70-73.68 Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563-64.
69 Stabile, supra note 38, at 342.
70 348 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1976).
71 Id. at 697.
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directing all representatives of the press or news media "not to publish or
report any statements made or testimony given in the trial"72 as a prior
restraint directed at the press. By presuming that such a prior restraint was
impermissible and by directing the trial judge to consider alternatives to a gag
order against the press, 73 the Ohio decision parallels the reasoning and
requirements set forth in Nebraska Press.
IV. CONTROLuNG THE SPEECH Op TRIAL PARTICIPANTS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO A PRIOR RESTRAiNT AGAiNST THE PRESS
Although Ohio trial judges in criminal cases must not issue gag orders
directly restraining what the press may report, one of the alternatives judges
consider under the Nebraska Press test74 permits restraining trial participants'
speech to the press. Whereas gag orders directed toward the media
presumptively are unconstitutional, 75 gag orders directed at trial participants,
attorneys, court personnel, and witnesses may be upheld if the pretrial publicity
obtained from the speech constitutes a "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice." 76
A. Sheppard v. Maxwell Dicta
Precedent for controlling what trial participants may say to the press stems
from the Sheppard v. Maxwell dicta noting that effective control of the
prosecution, the defendant, defense counsel, court personnel, and law
72 1d. at 699.
73 Id. at 697.
74 See supra text accompanying note 65.
75 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
76 Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ., majority
opinion). The Gentile Court stated that the "rights [of litigants] may be subordinated to other
interests that arise in [the courthouse] setting." Md at 1073 (citing Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33, n.18 (1984), which held that a newspaper defendant in a
libel action could be restrained from publishing material about the plaintiffs when the
newspaper gained access to the information through discovery associated with the trial); see
also Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 610 (2d Cir.) (applying the reasonable
likelihood standard that pretrial publicity will prejudice a fair trial), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
946 (1988). Mark Stabile suggests that gagging trial participants still allows the media to
attend all trial proceedings and to report on them. Stabile, supra note 38, at 353; see also
Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1448 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "the press remains free to attend the trial and scrutinize the fairness
of the proceedings" while upholding a gag order on trial participants).
1548 [Vol. 56:1537
TRUAL PARTICIPATS' SPEECH
enforcement officers would have prevented inaccurate leads and "groundless
rumors and confusion." 77 The Court instructed the trial judge to take steps by
rule or regulation that would protect the judicial process from outside
prejudicial influences. 78 According to the Court, orders directed at trial
participants are warranted because "[n]either prosecutors, counsel for the
defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement offiers ... [are]
permitted to frustrate [the court's] function." 79 Collaboration between counsel
and the press concerning information that is reasonably likely to prevent a fair
trial80 is subject to the trial court's regulation and disciplinary measures 81
B. The Ohio Supreme Court Distinguishes Between Prior Restraints and
Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants
The distinction between regulating the press directly and regulating the
speech of trial participants is also reflected in In re TR. 82 an Ohio Supreme
Court decision upholding a juvenile court judge's gag order directed at trial
participants. 83 The Ohio Court stated that a gag order against trial participants
is not a prior restraint on the press; 84 rather, this order merely limits the
participants merely from conducting themselves in a manner that could
jeopardize the fairness of the judicial process. 85 According to the Ohio court's
77 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359, 361 (1966); see also supra text
accompanying notes 21-29.
78 Id. at 363.
79 Id.
80 In Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1062, the Supreme Court applied a slightly stricter standard
to prohibitions on certain extrajudicial attorney speech during a criminal trial. The Court
held that gagging extrajudicial attorney speech was constitutional as long as such speech
posed a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to the fairness of the trial. Id. at 1063.
The Court also noted that most lower courts after the Sheppard decision applied a
"reasonable likelihood of prejudicing a fair trial" test. Hd at 1067-68. Ten years after the
Sheppard decision, the American Bar Association amended its guidelines so that
extrajudicial attorney speech was regulated by a "clear and present danger" test, while the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct drafted in the early 1980s applied a "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" test like that upheld in the Gentile case. Id. at 1068.
81 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
82 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).
83 Id. at 455. The court found that the trial judge had properly issued a gag order, but
ordered the trial judge to modify the order so that it would not be overbroad. ld. at 455-56.
84 Id. at 453-54 (citing Central S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Sigma
Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182 (D. S.C.), afid, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978)).85 Id. at 454-55.
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reasoning, a gag order against trial participants is a less restrictive alternative to
a prior restraint against the media.8 6 Neither the public nor the press suffers
any personal injury other than a general deprivation of a right to know.87
C. Citicism of Gag Orders Against Trial Participants and Application of
a Clear and Present Danger Analysis
Critics of this distinction drawn in Sheppard and in In re T.R. would apply
heightened scrutiny to both types of gag orders-those directed at trial
participants as well as those directed at the press. According to Rend L. Todd's
Note concerning gag orders directed at trial participants, such an order
provides the trial judge with a "back door for restricting communication about
trial activities without incurring the prohibitive scrutiny of prior restraint
doctrine."88 According to Todd's reasoning, any order that reduces the total
communication available to the media concerning the trial should be treated as
a prior restraint and subject to a presumption against constitutionality. 89
Todd further argues that gag orders directed at trial participants delay
speech concerning the trial and assure that information about the trial is not
published at the time when it could be most helpful. If the "participant speech
is delayed beyond the scope of public attention, the media may have little
interest in obtaining and disseminating that information... ."90 Consequently,
the public may not become aware of important facts and interpretations of the
trial; likewise the public loses "the opportunity to respond to perceived judicial
misconduct when that misconduct [can] be most easily remedied." 91
86 ld. at 454 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976)).
87 Id. at 455; see also State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d
127, 158 (Ohio 1976) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (stating that "[alIthough the Constitution,
except in limited circumstances, absolutely protects the right of the press to publish such
information as it possesses, the protection afforded by the Constitution to the concomitant
right of the press to gather news for the purpose of publication is not nearly so pervasive")
(footnote omitted).
88 Ren6 L. Todd, Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response
to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants, 88 MlcH. L. REv. 1171,
1172 (1990). Todd also claims that judges have a propensity to over regulate trial
participant speech because it is relatively easy for them to issue a gag order; such orders
require little judicial time or deliberation. Id. at 1185. This Note, however, illustrates that
several considerations and steps must be made by a trial judge restraining trial participant
speech in order for the gag order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.89 Id. at 1173.




Also applying a heightened scrutiny test to gag orders directed at trial
participants, the Sixth Circuit in a civil case preceding the Nebraska Press
decision held that such gag orders are unconstitutional prior restraints. 92 In
CBS, Inc. v. Young, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that because trial participant gag
orders effectively remove from the press significant and meaningful sources of
information, such orders are only warranted if the trial participant speech poses
a "clear and present danger of a serious or imminent threat" to the fair
administration of justice.93 In the Sixth Circuit, gag orders directed at trial
participants bear the same presumption of unconstitutionality as do prior
restraints directed at the media.94
The Sixth Circuit also applied this heightened scrutiny test in United States
v. Ford,95 a criminal case in which a gag order restricted the criminal
defendant's speech. 96 Because the trial court prohibited Congressman Ford
from making any extrajudicial statements that a "reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication, " 97 except
statements on the floor of the House of Representatives or statements that he is
not guilty of the charges, 98 the order implicated the defendant's First
Amendment right to respond to charges. 99 The order, however, did not
implicate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. In this
case, the common conflict between defendants' Sixth Amendment rights and
92 CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 1975). But see Dow Jones & Co.
v. Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 608, 609 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the Sixth Circuit's analysis and
holding that a "critical distinction" exists between orders directed at the press, a form of
censorship that the First Amendment attempts to abolish, and orders directed at trial
participants), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764
F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1985) (plurality opinion) (holding that an order directed against all
parties, their representatives, and their attorneys "neither denies the media access to any
criminal proceeding nor bars the media from disseminating any information that it
obtains.").
93 CBS, 522 F.2d at 239 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)).
94 Id. at 241 (stating that "[a]ny restrictive order involving a prior restraint upon First
Amendment freedoms is presumptively void and may be upheld only on the basis of a clear
showing that an exercise of First Amendment rights will interfere with the rights of the
parties to a fair trial."); see also supra text accompanying notes 59-69.
95 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987) (plurality opinion).
96/R at 600.
9 7 1d. at 597.
98/X
99JR at 599 (stating that the "accused has a First Amendment right to reply publicly to
the prosecutor's charges... .") (quoting Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior
Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi
v. Obiter Didion, 29 STAN. L. Ray. 607, 618 (1977)).
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the press' and public's First Amendment rights did not exist; instead, the
defendant's First Amendment rights conflicted with the government's and
public's interest in seeing that the prosecution produces a fair result.10 In the
context of a trial participant order as applied to the criminal defendant,' 0' the
court found that the defendant's extrajudicial speech did not constitute a "clear
and present danger" of a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice.' 0 2 As Judge Merritt's plurality opinion stated, "[trial judges, the
government, the lawyers and the public must tolerate robust and at times
acrimonious or even silly public debate about litigation." 13 As a result, in the
Sixth Circuit, gag orders that restricted criminal defendants' statements to the
press had to meet a strict clear and present danger standard. 104
D. The U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Trial Participant Gag Orders in
Gentile v. State Bar
The Sixth Circuit decisions, however, predate the U.S. Supreme Court
decision upholding a disciplinary rule prohibiting counsel in a criminal trial
from making certain extrajudicial comments. After the Court's plurality
decision in Gentile v. State Bar,105 the Sixth Circuit's heightened scrutiny
approach does not apply to most criminal-proceeding gag orders directed at
counsel. 1°6 In Gentile, a plurality of the Court10 7 held constitutional a Nevada
100 Id at 600 & n.1.
101 The court explicitly stated that it was not considering the authority of the judge to
restrain the speech of lawyers, officers of the court, or witnesses. i at 597.
102 Id. at600.
103 Id. at599.
104 The court also held that the order was overbroad and that the trial judge did not
specifically find that less burdensome alternatives such as voir dire, sequestration of the
jury, and change of venue would have preserved the integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Hd at 600.
105 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) The opinion of the Court was delivered by two justices in
two separate opinions. "Kennedy, I., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and VI .... Rehnquist, CJ., delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II." Id. at 1032.
106 See id. at 1036 (Kennedy, '., opinion) ("A rule governing speech, even speech
entitled to full constitutional protection, need not use the words 'clear and present danger' in
order to pass constitutional muster."). Although this portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion
was not part of the majority's opinion as to the constitutional test, all of the Justices appear
to agree that a "clear and present danger" test is not warranted for gag orders directed at
counsel in criminal trials. See id. at 1074 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion).
107 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion spoke for the majority as to the substantial
likelihood of material prejudice standard because Justice O'Connor joined part of the
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Supreme Court rule prohibiting attorneys from making "an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means
of public communication" if the attorney "knows or reasonably should know
that [the extrajudicial statement] will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 10 8 The rule further provided attorneys
with a safe harbor in which statements about the general nature of the defense,
without elaboration, would not be subject to discipline. 109 After the indictment
of the defendant whom Gentile was representing, Gentile held a press
conference in which he attacked the indictment and accused the prosecutor and
police department of misusing their authority. n 0 As a result of this exercise of
"classic political speech,""' 1 the state bar disciplined Gentile.
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion held that gag orders directed at
criminal counsel can be constitutional when the prohibited speech is
substantially likely to materially prejudice the fairness of the proceedings." 2
This standard provides a "constitutionally permissible balance between the First
Amendment rights of attorneys... and the State's [and public's] interest[s] in
fair trials." 113 According to the Rehnquist plurality, such a gag order against
attorneys was "expressly contemplated"" 4 by Sheppard v. Maxwell; attorney
speech while representing a client may be governed by a less rigorous standard
than that the Nebraska Press presumption of unconstitutionality." 5 Following
the guidance from Gentile, Ohio trial courts, constitutionally can issue a gag
order restricting the speech of attorneys and other trial participants" 6 when
opinion. Justice O'Connor, however, also joined part of Justice Kennedy's opinion so that a
majority of the Court also held that the safe harbor portion of the rule was void for
vagueness.
108 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033 (Kennedy, I., opinion).
109 Id. A majority of the Court held this provision to be void for vagueness. See infra
note 188.
110 Id. at 1033-34.
111 Id. at 1034.112 Id. at 1063 (Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion)..
113 Id. at 1075.
114 Ld. at 1072.
115 Id. at 1072-73 (also citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (im which a newspaper defendant in a civil case was prohibited
from publishing material about the plaintiffs which the newspaper gained through
discovery)). In her concurrence with this part of the opinion, Justice O'Connor further
stressed that attorneys, as "officers of the court," may be subject to ethical constraints that
prevent them from speaking in an otherwise constitutionally protected manner. Id. at 1081-
82 (O'Connor, J., concurring opinion).
116 Although Gentile deals explicitly with court rules governing attorney speech, the
Rehnquist majority opinion occasionally speaks in terms of prohibiting trial participants in
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such speech constitutes a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the
criminal proceeding.
E. Lower Federal Courts Uphold Gag Orders Directed at Tal
Participants
When balancing defendants' Sixth Amendment rights and the press' and
public's First Amendment rights, Ohio trial judges also can garner some
guidance from other federal decisions upholding restraints on trial participants'
speech. 117 For example, Justice Rehnquist, acting as a circuit judge, refused to
stay a gag order in a murder case when the trial court prohibited court
personnel, counsel, witnesses and jurors from speaking directly with the
press. 118 In KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, Justice
Rehnquist approved a gag order119 in which a court-appointed liaison served as
a "unified and singular source for the media." 120 Reasoning that Sheppard v.
Maxwll justified such an order, 121 Justice Rehnquist found that even the "mere
potential for confusion... between trial participants and the press" warranted
the gag order restricting trial participants' speech. 122
When an investigation into the affairs of a military contractor led to the
indictment of a former Bronx borough president and Congressman Mario
general. In Rehnquist's opinion, he states that Sheppard v. Maxwell expressly contemplates
restricting speech of "those paricipating before courts." Id. at 1072 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
majority opinion) (emphasis added). Other federal circuit court cases decided before and
after Genti/e also suggest that gag orders directed at all trial participants are wan-anted if
such speech constitutes a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal
proceeding. See infra discussion accompanying notes 118-44.
117 In addition to the cases cited, infra, see also News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939
F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that an order aimed at trial participants is not
telling the media to do something or not to do something-thus, the court upheld an order
prohibiting the "prosecution, counsel for the defense, witnesses, defendants, court
personnel," and members of the local police and sheriff's department from releasing,
making, or authorizing release of "extra judicial statements for dissemination by any means
of public communication" when such statements relate to matters of the case).
118 KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302, 1307 (1982)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
119 Id. at 1308.
120 Id. at 1302-03.
121 Id. at 1306. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, noted that the trial remained open to
the public at all times and that the court issued no prior restraint directly restricting what the
press may report of the proceedings in open court. Id. at 1302. See supra text
accompanying notes 30-41 and 59-73.
122 Id. at 1307.
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Biaggi, and when trial participants were suspected of leaking the identifies and
testimony of grand jury witnesses, the Second Circuit in Dow Jones & Co. v.
Simon'23 also upheld a gag order against criminal defendants and their
counsel. 124 Because the trial participants effectively made the secret grand jury
proceedings a matter of public knowledge, the trial court prohibited them from
making certain extrajudicial statements concerning the case. 125 The court
prohibited such statements when they were made to persons associated with the
media or when a reasonable person would expect such statements would be
communicated to the media.126 The order, however, did permit statements
"without elaboration or characterization... concernin[g] the general nature of
an allegation or defense," "information contained in the public record," and
"the scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings." 127 Finding
that a "critical distinction" 128 existed between directly restraining the media
and restricting the speech of trial participants, the Second Circuit held that
maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings warranted a restriction on
trial participants' speech. 129 A gag order against trial participants was
warranted because the speech was reasonably likely to prejudice a fair trial. 130
Similarly, in In re Russel 3' the Fourth Circuit upheld an order prohibiting
potential witnesses 132 in a criminal case from making extrajudicial statements
relating to their testimony. 133 When their communication was intended for
dissemination by means of public communication, 134 potential witnesses could
not discuss testimony that may be given in the case, any "parties or issues
123 842 F.2d 603, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
124 Id. at 612.
125 Id. at 605.
126 Id. at 6O6.
127 Id
128 Ij at 608.
129 JiLd at 611.
130 Id. at 611. Note that the reasonable likelihood standard is a more relaxed standard
than that approved in Gentile when the Rehnquist majority endorsed a "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard. Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030, 1063 (1991) (Rehnquist,
CJ., majority opinion). See also infra text accompanying notes 154-62.
131 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984).
132 "Potential witness" was defined as a person "who ha[d] been notified by the
government or by defendants that he or she may be called to testify in th[e] case, or any
person who ha[d] actually testified" in the case. Id. at 1009.
133 d. at 1008.
134 Statements which were intended for dissemination by means of public
communication expressly included extrajudicial statements "by a potential witness to any
third party [when the] potential witness authorize[d], intend[ed], or expect[ed the third
party] to disseminate [the] statement by means of public communication." Id. at 1009.
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[that] reasonably should [have been] expect[ed] to be involved in th[e] case, or
the events leading up to [the case]." 135 Recognizing the difficulty trial judges
encounter when trying to formulate a restrictive order, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that Sheppard v. Maxwell and Nebraska Press warranted an order
regulating witnesses' speech 136
F. Ohio Couns Uphold Gag Orders Directed at Trial ParricipanW
Ohio cases considering the conflict between Sixth Amendment and First
Amendment rights provide further precedent for issuing gag orders that
constitutionally restrain what trial participants may say.137 The Ohio Supreme
Court in State eX rel. Cincinnati Post v. Court of Common Pleas138
distinguished between restricting the press and restricting the speech of persons
involved in the judicial process.' 39 Although the court found that an order
prohibiting anyone from talking to the jurors about the case was overbroad, 140
the court explained that trial participants and officers of the court voluntarily
assume a "special status. " 141 Trial participants "subject themselves to greater
restraints on their communications than might constitutionally be applied to the
general public," 142 and protecting the freedom of the press does not specifically
135 Id. at 1008.
136 Id. at 1010-11.
137 In addition to the cases cited, infra, see also State ec rel. National Broadcasting Co.
v. Lake County Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (Ohio 1990) (stating that
a trial court judge must hold a hearing to restrain the speech of court participants, and a gag
order may issue only if the trial judge makes specific findings "demonstrating that.., there
is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by
publicity that... [the gag order] would prevent and... reasonable alternatives... cannot
adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights"); State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v.
Golden, 442 N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ohio App. 1982) (stating that prior restraints on the press
are a "last resort measure," but distinguishing between orders directed at trial participants
and orders directed at the press itself).
One Ohio appellate court found that an order requiring public comments by all counsel
of record, court personnel, and law enforcement officers to be made in writing by lead
counsel or by the court did not constitute a gag order because the order did not require trial
participants to refrain from discussing the case with reporters. State ex rel. Bellefontaine
Examiner v. O'Connor, No. 8-93-12, at 6 (3d Dist. Ct. Ohio Nov. 23, 1993).
138 570 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1991).
13 9 Id. at 1104.
140 Id. at 1102, 1104; see also infra part V.A.





entail protecting the press' right to gather information.' 43 As a consequence, in
Ohio a more narrowly focused gag order directed at trial participants' speech
may withstand constitutional scrutiny. 144
G. Ohio Cour Rues and Disciplinary Rules Provide Guidance to Issue
Gag Orders
When balancing defendants' Sixth Amendment rights against the press' and
public's First Amendment rights, Ohio trial judges striving to craft a
constitutional gag order also should consider the obligations set forth under
Ohio court and disciplinary rules. Such rules provide a further basis upon
which trial judges may restrict the speech of trial participants. Whereas the
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct' 45 and the Ohio Rules of Superintendence for
143 Ld. at 1102; see also In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 958 (1990). In In re T.R., a custody contest prompted extensive media coverage,
including national coverage by People magazine, the New York Tnes, the tabloid
newspaper Star, and the Geraldo talk show. A trial judge order prohibited "adult parties,
their attorneys, and their agents from 'disseminating any information about this pending
cause or about the minor child... to any and all persons... including, but not limited to,
representatives of both the broadcast and print media; and... from appearing on any and
all radio and television broadcasts regarding these causes or the minor child herein .... '"
Id. at 443. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the order was overbroad, id. at 455, but the
court noted that a properly tailored order may be warranted because a juvenile court
proceeding is not "presumptively open" and because the trial judge has the "power to
control extrajudicial comments by the litigants." Id. at 454.144 Id. at 1104-05.
145 See OHIO CODE OFIUDICLAL CONDUCr Canon 3(A)(7) (1994), stating:
A trial judge or appellate court should permit:
(c) the broadcasting, televising, recording, and taking of photographs in the courtroom
by news media during sessions of the court, including recesses between sessions, under
the following conditions:
(i) permission should be expressly granted in advance in writing by the trial judge or
appellate court pursuant to such conditions as the judge or appellate court and
superintendence rules of the Supreme Court may prescribe;
(ii) the trial judge or appellate court determines, upon consideration of a request for
permission for the broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking of photographs in the
courtroom in a particular case, that the broadcasting, televising, recording, and taking
of photographs would not distract participants or impair the dignity of the proceedings
or otherwise materially interfere with the achievement of a fair trial or hearing therein;
(ii) the filming, videotaping, recording, or taking of photographs of victims or
witnesses who object thereto shall not be permitted;




Courts of Common Pleas146 both provide for the broadcasting, recording by
electronic means, and photographing of court proceedings open to the public,
these rules and the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility 147 also suggest
that speech of trial participants, especially attorneys, may be limited. Canon
3(A)(7)(c) of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct states that the trial judge
should grant permission for media coverage of the court proceedings only when
"the broadcasting, televising, recording, or taldng of photographs in the
courtroom... would not distract participants,... impair the dignity of the
proceedings or... materially interfere with the achievement of a fair
trial.. -148 Whereas the holding of Nebraska Press149 indicates that the
judge should not regulate what the media may report about the open trial
proceedings, this Canon suggests that the judge may regulate the speech of trial
participants as potential sources to the media when such speech materially
interferes with the achievement of a fair trial. By specifically referring to the
standards of Canon 3(A)(7) of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, the Ohio
Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas Rule 11(A)150
incorporates the Canon's standard and provides a further basis for restricting
the speech of potential media sources.
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-107,
although not worded identically to the Nevada disciplinary rule upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar,151 provides the Ohio trial judge
with still further justification for restricting attorney speech. As applied to
attorney speech during the selection of a jury or trial in a criminal matter, 152
Rule 7-107(D) states:
Id.
146 See OHIO RULES Op SUPERINTENDENcE F OR COURTS OF COMMON PLEAS Rule 11 (A)
(1994), stating that "the judge presiding at the trial or hearing shall permit the broadcasting
or recording by electronic means and the taking of photographs in court proceedings open
to the public as provided in Canon 3(A)(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct...
147 Omo CODE OFPROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrrYDR 7-107(A) (1993).
148 OIO CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUcr Canon 3(a)(7)(c)(ii) (1994).
149 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (stating that"barriers to prior restraint remain high and
the presumption against its use continues").
150 OHO RULES OF SUPERINrENDENCE F R COURTS OF COMMON PLEAS Rule 11(A)
(1994).
151 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
152 Disciplinary Rule 7-107 also sets forth obligations for the attorney who may
disseminate information concerning the case at various stages of the criminal proceedings.
Disciplinary Rule 7-107(A), for example, establishes the lawyer's obligation during the
investigation of a criminal matter. DR 7-107(A) states:
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal matter
shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable
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person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that
does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the offense and, if
permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other matters and
the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
Oino CODE OF PROm'.SIONAL RESPONSmILrrY DR 7-107(A) (1994).
DR 7-107(B) sets forth the lawyer's obligation at the time of the filing of a complaint,
information or indictment, issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commencement
of the trial or disposition without trial. During these times, a lawyer or law firm associated
with a criminal matter may not:
make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments,
or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the
accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of
the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the merits
of the case.
OHIO CODE OF PROFSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-107(B) (1994).
During the time period after investigation and before trial or disposition without trial,
however, DR 7-107(C) states that certain "safe harbors" exist in which the attorney may
speak about certain subjects without fear of being disciplined. DR 7-107(C) states:
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid in his
apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the
investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other than a
confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
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[A] lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal
matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or
other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that
he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the court in
the case.15 3
Because under Rule 7-107(D) an attorney in a criminal matter already has
an ethical obligation not to speak in a manner that poses a reasonable likelihood
of interfering with a fair trial, an Ohio trial judge issuing an order restricting
attorneys' speech can assert that the order enforces the attorney's ethical
obligations.
In Gentile v. State Bar, the U.S. Supreme Court plurality upheld a similar
Nevada disciplinary rule restricting attorney speech when such speech posed a
"substantial likelihood of material[ly] prejudic[ing]" the fairness of the
proceedings. 154 The Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility Rule, however,
permits the restriction of attorney speech when such speech is "reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial." 155 Although the practical application of
these two standards is not clear, 156 the Ohio standard appears to be less
protective of attorney speech. When the Southern District of Ohio federal court
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
OHo CODE OF IROfESSIONAL REspoNsiRILrry DR 7-107(C) (1994). Note that this section
does not provide a safe harbor provision in which the attorney may state "without
elaboration... the general nature of the... defense." Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S.
1030, 1048 (1991). Such a safe harbor provision was determined to be unconstitutionally
void for vagueness by Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Gentile. Id.; see also infra note
188.
153 Oino CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(D) (1994).
154 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.I., majority opinion).
155 OHIo CODE Op PROmSSIONAL RESpoNsimLrrTY DR 7-107(D) (1994); see also
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.L, majority opinion).
156 Wachsman v. Disciplinary Counsel, No. C-2-90-335, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXlS
20899, at *20 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1991). (stating that the Supreme Court in Gentile found
constitutional the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard, but it left
unresolved whether the "reasonable likelihood of prejudice" standard is constitutional).
Although not discussing the Ohio standard, Justice Kennedy noted in Gentile that the
difference between the Nevada standard of "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
and other states' standards that attorney speech may be disciplined under the rule if it poses
a "serious and imminent threat" to the fairness of the trial could be a difference of "mere
semantics." Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1037 (Kennedy, J., opinion). This statement may suggest
that the Supreme Court holding of constitutionality could be extended to other formulations
of disciplining attorneys' extrajudicial speech.
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interpreted Gentile and Ohio Rule 7-107157 in Wachsman v. Disciplinary
Counsel,'5 8 the court cautioned that the Gentile holding of constitutionality
does not necessarily render constitutional the standard set forth in the Ohio
disciplinary rule.159 Moreover, in Ohcago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,160 a
case decided long before the Supreme Court's Gentile decision, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned an Illinois disciplinary rule that was nearly
identical to the present Ohio rule because the rule was unconstitutionally
overbroad. 161 Applying a standard different from that of the Gentile rule or the
Ohio rule, the Seventh Circuit concluded that attorneys' extrajudicial comments
may be proscribed only when the comments "pose a 'serious and imminent
threat' of interference with the fair administration of justice." 162 As a result of
this uncertain constitutionality of the Ohio standard as it compares to the
Gentile standard, an Ohio trial judge may restrict attorney speech by relying on
Gentile v. State Bar and the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, but
careful trial judges should restrict attorney speech only when the speech poses a
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice."
In addition to the guidance Ohio trial judges may find in the Ohio
disciplinary and court rules, judges issuing gag orders directed at trial
participants also may garner support from the Judicial Conference of the United
States Free Press-Fair Trial Guidelines. 163 Because prosecutors and defense
attorneys constitute "one of the chief sources of prejudicial publicity in a
criminal case," 164 the Conference concluded that Sheppard v. Maxwell gives
trial courts the power and duty to regulate attorneys as sources of
information: 165
157 See OHIO CoDE oF PROFmSIONAL RESPONsIBIrrY DR 7-107(G) (1994).
158 No. C-2-90-335, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20899, at *19-20.
159 Id. In 1991 Ohio and ten other states had not yet adopted Model Rule 3.6, the
model on which the Nevada Supreme Court rule in Gentile was based. The standard that
Ohio uses is less protective of lawyer speech because it utilizes a "reasonable likelihood of
prejudice" standard as opposed to the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
standard. Id.
160 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), ceit. denied, Cunningham v. Chicago Council of
Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
161 Id. at 249.
162 Id. (quoting Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970)); see also
HIrschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 371 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that Disciplinary Rule 7-
107(D) and its prohibition from speaking on matters that are "reasonabl[y] likely to interfere
with a fair trial" is unconstitutionally vague).
16 3 Revised Free Press-Fair Trial Guidelines of the Judicial Conference of the United
States-1980, 87 F.R.D. 519 (1980).
164 ld. at 527.165 Id. (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966)).
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[IThe trial judge should regulate and control the proceedings by special
directions to trial participants, spectators, and news media representatives
where necessary to preserve decorum in and around the courtroom and to
maintain the integrity of the trial.... Such a special order might...
proscri[be]... extrajudicial statements by participants in the trial (including
lawyers, parties, witnesses, jurors and court officials) which might divulge
prejudicial matter not of public record in the case. 1 6 6
These guidelines for federal judges provide Ohio trial judges with yet
another federal source that advocates the use of gag orders to restrict trial
participants' speech.
V. CONSTiTrIONAL GAG ORDERS MUST NOT BE OVERBROAD AND
MUST MAKE EXPLIT FNDINGS REMCTTNG ANY ALTERNATIVES
A. Overbreadth
By following federal decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the circuit
courts and by enforcing court and disciplinary rules, Ohio trial judges may
constitutionally constrain the speech of trial participants. The court must hold a
hearing and determine by specific findings on the record that the speech poses a
"substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" the fairness of the
proceeding. Even if an order gagging trial participant speech is based upon the
proper standards and is accompanied by the proper findings, the order will be
overruled if it is overly broad, or if it prohibits protected as well as unprotected
speech. Ohio trial judges wishing to construct narrowly tailored gag orders
must avoid orders that restrict all trial participant speech to the press. The
Second Circuit in United States v. Salameh,167 for example, held that a blanket
provision preventing trial participants from making any statements that "have
anything to do with th[e] case" or that "may have something to do with the
case" was unconstitutionally overbroad. 168 The Sixth Circuit applied similar
reasoning in United States v. Ford169 when it held unconstitutional 70 an order
prohibiting the defendant from making any "extrajudicial statement that a
166 Id. at 529-30.
167 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993).
168 Id. at 447. The oral order was made sua sponte when the judge instructed the trial
participants that "[tihere will be no more statements [in the press, on TV, on radio, or in
any other electronic media] issued by either side or their agents." Id. at 446. The trial judge
told the attorneys, "[tihe next time I pick up a paper and see a quotation from any of you,
you had best be prepared to have some money." Id.
169 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987); see also supra text accompanying notes 95-104.
170 Id. at 600.
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reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication." 171 This overly broad order unconstitutionally covered
"opinion[s] of or discussion of the evidence and facts in the investigation,"
statements about "alleged motive[s] the government may have had in filing the
indictment," and "opinion[s] as to... the merits of the case."' 72
In Levine v. United States District Court,173 the Ninth Circuit held an
order to be overbroad' 74 when it stated that "all attorneys in this case, all
parties and all their representatives and agents of counsel and the parties shall
not make any statements to members of the news media concerning any aspect
of this case that bears upon the merits to be resolved by the jury."' 75 The
Levine court noted that many statements that may bear "upon the merits to be
resolved by the jury" would present little or no danger of prejudicing the
fairness of the proceedings. The court suggested that a narrowly tailored gag
order directed at the trial participants could proscribe statements relating to the
following subjects:
(1) The character, credibility, or reputation of a party;
(2) The identity of a witness or the expected testimony of a party or a witness;
(3) The contents of any pretrial confession, admission, or statement given by a
defendant or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
(4) The identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented or the
absence of such physical evidence;
(5) The strengths or weaknesses of the case of either party; and
(6) Any other information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence and would create a substantial risk of
prejudice if disclosed. 176
Ohio cases construing gag orders directed at trial participants also instruct
trial judges to narrowly tailor such orders. In In re TR.,177 the Ohio Supreme
Court struck down an overbroad order 178 in a custody case because the order
171 Id. at 597.
172 Id.
173 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158
(1988).
174 Ij at 599.
175 Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
176 Id. at 599. Note that item six, stating a standard allowing speech to be restricted if
it creates a "substantial risk of prejudice," closely resembles the Gentile "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard. See Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991)
(Rehnquist, CJ., majority opinion).
177 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).
178 Id. at 455.
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enjoined all parties from "disseminating any information" about the case to
"any and all persons" and from otherwise providing, "directly or indirectly 'in
any fashion whatsoever,' any information regarding" the minor child. 179 The
Ohio Supreme Court found a similar order in State ex rel. Nat'l Broadcasting
Co. v. Lake County Court of Common Pleas1 80 to be unconstitutional 8'
because it forbade trial participants and law enforcement personnel from
making any public comment on the case.182 Yet another Ohio Supreme Court
case' 83 found overbroad' 84 an order that "[n]o one... talk to the jurors about
the case, and the jurors aren't to talk to anybody about it" because the order
seemingly applied to "everyone," including persons who were not trial
participants. 185 Similarly, an Ohio appellate court found unconstitutionally
overbroad1 86 an order that trial participants may not make any statements that
"could interfere with the defendant's right to a free and fair trial and due
process of law." 187
These federal and Ohio cases therefore suggest that Ohio trial judges
formulating gag orders must avoid sweeping statements that apply to persons
who are not trial participants and must not proscribe all trial participants'
statements to the press. Whereas dicta offered by the Ninth Circuit suggests
that trial judges may issue gag orders prohibiting statements by trial
participants, constitutional orders may prohibit only statements concerning
certain aspects of the case.' 88
1791d.
180 State cc rel. Nat'1 Broadcasting Co. v. Lake County Court of Common Pleas, 556
N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990).
181 Id. at 1124.
182 Id. at 1123.
183 State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Hamilton County, 570 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1991).
184 ILd. at 1102.
185 Id.
186 State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Golden, 442 N.E.2d 121, 126 (Ohio App.
1982).187 Id. at 123.
188 Because the Kennedy majority in Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., majority opinion), found that the safe harbor provision of the Nevada
Supreme Court rule was void for vagueness, trial judges formulating gag orders directed at
trial participants also should be careful to make the terms of the order as specific as
possible. The order must give fair notice of what is protected. Id. The Nevada rule provided
that a lawyer may "state without elaboration ... the general nature of the.. . defense"
without being disciplined. Id. The Court, however, found that this provision was
unconstitutionally vague. Id. Ohio trial judges, therefore, probably should avoid wording




B. Findings Dismissing the Effectiveness of Alternatives
In order to formulate a constitutional gag order directed at trial
participants, trial judges also must make explicit on the record findings that
alternatives to the gag order will not mitigate the prejudice to defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights. Ohio trial judges explicitly must consider and reject the
alternatives of voir dire, jury instructions, change of venue, and sequestration
of the jury.
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,5 9 when the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned the trial judge's, order against the press, 190 the Court noted that
reversal was warranted partly because the trial court made no express finding
that other measures would not control prejudice to the defendant. 191 The Court
recommended change of venue, postponement of the trial, searching questions
of prospective jurors, clear jury instructions, and sequestration of the jury as
alternatives to the prior restraint.' 92 Picking up on this language, lower federal
court decisions considering trial participant gag orders held that a constitutional
gag order requires the trial judge explicitly to consider and dismiss the
effectiveness of these alternatives.' 93 When rejecting alternatives to a gag
order, however, a trial judge may consider whether the alternatives force the
jurisdiction to incur great expense. According to Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Gentile v. State Bar.
189 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
190 Id. at 568.
191 Id. at 563.
192 Ii at 563-64.
193 See, e.g., Dow Iones & Co. v. Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 611-12 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1987)
(plurality opinion). In Dow Jones the Second Circuit found that the gag order against trial
participants was valid because the court "carefully considered and found the use of these
other measures unable to stop the grand jury leaks." Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 612. In Ford
the Sixth Circuit reversed the gag order as it was directed at the criminal defendant partially
because the trial judge did not make specific considerations of less burdensome alternatives
to the order. Ford, 830 F.2d at 600.
An Ohio appellate case considering a gag order constraining the media also holds that
the trial judge must consider and dismiss the alternatives to such an order. In State cc rel.
Dispatch Printing Co. v. Golden, 442 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio App. 1982), an Ohio appellate
court held that before a prior restraint diroxted at the media may be issued, the trial judge
must find that "all other measures within the power of the court to insure a fair trial have
been found to be unavailing and deficient." Id. at 126.
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[Even if a fair trial can ultimately be ensured through voir dire, change of
venue, or some other device, these measures entail serious costs to the
system. ... The State has a substantial interest in preventing officers of the
court, such as lawyers, from imposing such costs on the judicial system and on
the litigants. 19 4
1. Change of Venue
When evaluating alternatives to a gag order directed at trial participants,
trial court judges may find that in many high profile cases the federal courts'
suggested alternatives are inadequate and costly. Concerning a change of venue
as an alternative to issuing a gag order, a venue change could be ineffective for
a trial in which prejudicial information is distributed nationally. 195 Regardless
of the geographic scope of the publicity, such a change still does not give the
court effective control over unwarranted statements made by counsel. 196
Moreover, as Ohio Supreme Court Justice Celebrezze's dissent in State ex rel.
Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips'97 demonstrated, the state has an interest
in preserving the venue.198 A change of venue can amount "to a virtual
confession that the citizens of [the community] would be unable to afford this
defendant a fair trial."199 It implies that the "fairness and objectivity of the
citizens" in the original forum is inadequate while it denies the community an
"opportunity to observe its legal system" during the actual resolution of a
case. 20° Such a change also "presents numerous costly practical problems such
as transportation of witnesses to and from the trial, and transportation of jurors
194 Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (Rehnquist, C., majority
opinion).
195 Stabile, supra note 38, at 344. Robert S. Stephen suggests in his note on prejudicial
publicity that national awareness of a trial does not assure national prejudice toward the
defendant. Robert S. Stephen, Note, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a Criminal Trial:
Wat a Trial Court Can Do to Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a "Media Crcus", 26
Sui LK U. L REv. 1063, 1086 (1992). A venue of a high profile case should be changed
if there is local prejudice within the community but only awareness outside the community.
Id.
196 Levine v. United States Dist. Court., 764 F.2d 590, 600 (9th Cir. 1985) (plurality
opinion), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnqust's opinion in Gentile,
recognized that a change of venue would not have been effective to undo the statements
made by the defense attorney in that case. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075.
197 351 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1976) (Celebrezze, I., dissenting).
198 Ld. at 168-69.
199 Id. at 169.2OO d.
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to view the [crime scene]." 201 A venue change also may be "at variance with
the defendant's right to be tried in the community in which the crime
occurred." 202 Because of these costs and dilemmas, an Ohio trial judge
rejecting change of venue as an effective alternative to a gag order20 3 may
consider the alternative inadequate.
2. Postponement of Trial
As an alternative to issuing a gag order directed at trial participants,
postponement of a criminal trial may encroach upon defendants' rights to a
speedy trial.204 Delay of the proceeding also may exacerbate any backlog of the
court, and it may increase the public's attention and questioning once the trial
actually begins. 205 Even after the trial is postponed, excessive media attention
likely will resume upon the new trial date. 2°6 Ohio trial judges therefore may
take all of these disadvantages into consideration when finding that
postponement of the trial is an inadequate alternative to a gag order.
3. Voir Dire
As an alternative to issuing a gag order, voir dire also may provide little
assurance that defendants' rights to an impartial jury are being adequately
protected.207 The Ninth Circuit in Levine v. United States District Court,208 for
201 Id.
202 Garcia, supra note 43, at 1125. "The Sixth Amendment provides . .. that a
[criminal] defendant has a right to be tried before a 'jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.'" Id. at 1125 n.150.
203 In addition, the trial judge should consider the Ninth District Court of Appeals'
holding that before a trial court grants a motion for change of venue, "a good faith effort
should be made to impanel a jury." State v. Herring, 486 N.E.2d 119, 120 (Ohio App.
1984).
204 Stabile, supra note 38, at 343-44.
205 Id. at 344. William H. Erickson notes in his article about fair trial-free press
conflicts that stautory provisions in a particular jurisdiction may limit trial judges' ability to
postpone the trial. William H. Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemm,
29 STAN. L. REV. 485, 492 n.43 (1977).
206 Stephen, supra note 195, at 1085.
207 In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring),
Justice Brennan argues that trial judges should liberally apply voir dire and "broadly
explore ... the extent to which prospective jurors had read particular news accounts." Id.
at 602. Voir dire also may be more effective when individual jurors are questioned or when
jurors are questioned in small groups. Id. Justice Brennan also suggests that defense counsel
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example, noted that voir dire is completely ineffective against publicity
disseminated after the jury is selected and during the trial, and it does not
remedy any harm that may result from prejudicial statements made by trial
participants.2°9 Ohio trial judges, therefore, may gain guidance from this
federal decision and may reject voir dire as an effective gag order alternative.
4. Extensive Jury Instructions
In high profile criminal cases, extensive jury instructions often tell jurors
that they may not consider any news accounts that they heard before or during
the trial, yet such instructions may not be an effective alternative to a gag
order. These instructions often are considered an "ineffective remedy" 210
against prejudicial news accounts, and they do not address the threat of
prejudice resulting from trial participants' extrajudicial statements. 211 Because
such instructions necessarily would be long and detailed, the instructions also
might highlight the issues that the jurors are instructed to ignore.212 When
considering detailed jury instructions as an alternative to gag orders directed at
trial participants, Ohio trial judges often may find that such instructions
inadequately protect defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. 213
5. Sequestration
As an alternative to gag orders directed at trial participants, sequestration
of the jury is the most burdensome and costly alternative. As the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Levine214 considered the alternative of sequestration, it
noted that the district court labeled it an "undesirable alternative."
should be accorded great latitude when asking searching questions that might indicate bias.
Id.
208 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158
(1988).209 Id. at600.
2 1 0 Id. One commentator has stated that "[t]o the extent that voir dire is insufficient to
detect impartiality due to the subconscious character of some preconceptions of guilt, ... it
is unlikely that admonitions or instructions will have a remedial effect in erasing prejudice,
even in the usual case of the well-intentioned juror." Erickson, supra note 205, at 493 n.46.2 11 Levine, 764 F.2d at 600.
2 12 Stabile, supra note 38, at 345.
213 Robert S. Stephen, however, notes that because jury instructions are of only
nominal expense, trial courts should use such instructions in addition to any other
alternatives to a gag order or in addition to a gag order directed at trial participants.
Stephen, supra note 195, at 1090.
2 14 764 F.2d at 600.
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Sequestration actually may be a more drastic method of protecting the
defendant from potential prejudice than would be a gag order directed at trial
participants' speech.215 Sequestration forces the jurors to suffer because of the
trial participants' and media's highly publicized acts.216 Long periods of
sequestration also can produce juror resentment and can result in jury bias. 217
Furthermore, sequestration protects against prejudice only after the jury has
taken its oath; as an alternative to gag orders, it largely is ineffective against
potential juror bias prior to or during jury selection.218 When Ohio trial judges
consider sequestration as an alternative to a gag order directed at trial
participants' speech, these undesirable aspects may render sequestration an
ineffective option.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the modem era, criminal trials increasingly are played out in the media.
As a result, if the jurors are unable to set aside preconceived notions and are
unable to decide the case based only on the evidence presented in court,
criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury increasingly
could be jeopardized. Whereas trial judges in criminal cases have an affirmative
duty to protect defendants' Sixth Amendment rights, they may constitutionally
fulfill that duty by issuing a gag order restricting the speech of trial
participants.
When issuing a constitutional order, Ohio trial judges should not close the
criminal trial to the press or public, they should not issue an order directed at
what the press may report, and they should carefully follow the federal
decisions and restrict the trial participants' speech only when such speech poses
a substantial likelihood of materially interfering with the fair administration of
justice. When restricting trial participant speech in such a way, judges should
narrowly tailor the orders so that they are not overbroad, and they should make
explicit findings that alternatives to a gag order insufficiently protect
defendants' rights. By following the decisions and reasoning of federal courts
and Ohio court and disciplinary rules, Ohio trial judges in criminal cases may
constitutionally restrict trial participants' speech. Without such restrictions,
judges are not protecting defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. Excessive media
coverage then could threaten "the fair and efficient administration of
215 Id.





justice... [and] undernine[s] the public's confidence in the legitimacy of
verdicts and in the ability of the judiciary to resolve disputes." 219
219 Swatz, supra note 14, at 1417.
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